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Testing preference formation in learning design contingent 
valuation (LDCV) using advanced information and repetitive 
treatments  
 
 
	  
Abstract	  
	  
Policymakers have largely replaced Single Bounded Discrete Choice (SBDC) valuation by the 
more statistically efficient repetitive methods; Double Bounded Discrete Choice (DBDC) and 
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE). Repetitive valuation permits classification into rational 
preferences: (i) a-priori well-formed; (ii) consistent non-arbitrary values “discovered” through 
repetition and experience; (Plott, 1996; List 2003) and irrational preferences; (iii) consistent but 
arbitrary values as “shaped” by preceding bid level (Tufano, 2010; Ariely et al., 2003) and (iv) 
inconsistent and arbitrary values. Policy valuations should demonstrate behaviorally rational 
preferences. We outline novel methods for testing this in DBDC applied to renewable energy 
premiums in Chile.   
  
 
 
 
Key words: Contingent valuation; double bounded discrete choice; repetitive learning; advanced 
information learning; bid dependency; theories of preference formation. 
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1. Introduction to Learning Designs and Theories of Preference Formation  
 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) has been the Stated Preference methodology most 
used to elicit values of non-market goods in different fields.1 A major issue of discussion in the 
application of this method has been the selection of the elicitation format. The NOAA panel 
(Arrow et al., 1993) and Carson et al., (2003) recommend the use of a Single Bounded (SB) 
referendum format due to the claimed potential incentive compatibility property that Gibbard 
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) had established for binding referenda where real payments are in 
place. Despite these claims, evidence of convergence between SB contingent valuation results 
and real referendum mechanisms in economic experiments is decidedly mixed even when these 
experiments involve common market goods and straightforward market institutions (Burton et 
al., 2009; Cummings et al., 1997; Loomis et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 2001). Trends in Stated 
Preference research over the last two decades have seen the SB format largely sidelined for 
several reasons. Firstly, almost all recent developments in Stated Preferences have been towards 
the use of repetitive valuation methods, which provide greatly improved statistical efficiency and 
analytical insight such as multiple bounded CVM (Hanemann et al., 1991) and Discrete Choice 
Experiments (Louviere et al., 2000). Secondly these repetitive mechanisms are more consistent 
with important trends in behavioural economics that are concerned with the fundamental nature 
of human preference formation, where the Discovered Preference Hypothesis (DPH) by Plott 
(1996) argues that stable and theoretically consistent preferences are not pre-existent but the 
product of experience gained through practice and repetition. Plott argues that functioning 
markets provide such repetition and learning whereby individuals can discover the rules of the 
market, a process called “institutional learning” (by Braga and Stamer, 2005), and discover their 
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personal preferences through a process these authors call “value learning”. In a seminal paper on 
this subject Plott and Zeiler, (2005) examine whether internal consistency between values of 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) and values of Willingness To Accept (WTA) exists in initial 
valuations or whether such consistency is discovered or learned in repeat valuations. In a series of 
economic experiments they find that initial values are not consistent, but subsequent values are. 
Similarly, they find that the well-known anomaly known as the endowment effect is present in 
the initial elicitation, but not in the repeat elicitations. This theory of consistent preference 
formation through experience (after List, 2003) or learning (after Plott, 1996) is opposed to the 
alternative a-priori well-formed preference hypothesis which holds that existing preferences are 
consistent and can be most accurately elicited by single shot elicitation methods such as the 
Single Bounded Dichotomous Choice (SBDC). In the experimental economics literature it has 
been argued that learning processes of this type attenuate major theoretical preference anomalies 
such as the above-mentioned WTP/WTA difference and the endowment effect (e.g. List, 2002, 
2003, 2004; Plott and Zeiler, 2005). 
Bateman et al., (2008) was the first paper to apply these ideas to Stated Preference and 
claimed (on pp128-129) that “The first response SB format precludes either institutional or value 
learning and is in direct conflict with the DPH which would suggest that it is the last response in 
a series of valuations which should be attended to rather than the first”. This idea of preference 
learning during repeated choices has also been taken up by researchers using Discrete Choice 
Experiments (DCE) who have also observed that estimates of both preferences and variance 
obtained from the initial choice are often out of line with those obtained from subsequent choices 
(Carlsson et al., 2012; Hess et al., 2012; Czajkowski et al., 2014). This discussion in DCEs is 
further supported by the earlier classic literature in this discipline which describes in purely 
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empirical observational terms learning and fatigue effects in sequential DCE valuations (Brazell 
and Louviere, 1996; Bradley and Daly, 1994). 
The Double Bounded Dichotomous Choice (DBDC) approach in contingent valuation was 
introduced by Hanemann et al., (1991). It is an SBDC format with a follow-up discrete choice 
question. When a “yes” response is given to the SBDC question a higher bid level is offered; 
while a lower bid level is offered if there is a “no” response. This repetitive mechanism produces 
a more precise bounding of individuals’ willingness to pay and provides more statistically 
efficient estimates of values (Hanemann et al., 1991; Alberini, 1995). One of the major anomalies 
of DBDC refers to the internal inconsistency between the single bounded (SB) and the double 
bounded (DB) estimates derived from the same data set. This inconsistency relates to the 
considerably higher WTP estimates produced by the SBDC response to the first bid compared to 
the DB analysis, which is applied to the first and follow-up bids. The earliest papers on DBDC 
have demonstrated this difference (Hanemann et al., 1991; Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; 
McFadden, 1994) and the difference is referred to as stylized fact in an influential review paper 
by Carson and Groves, (2007) and represents one of the main criticisms of the DBDC elicitation 
format (DeShazo, 2002).2 However, Bateman et al., (2008) demonstrates that this inconsistency 
in SB and DB WTP is statistically significant when a single good is valued in isolation, but this 
inconsistency in value is shown to be attenuated in repetitive valuations of several goods.  
Bateman et al., (2008) also introduced the concept of Coherent Arbitrariness (Ariely et al., 
2003) into Stated Preference Valuation. Ariely et al., (2003) show that consistency is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for well-formed preferences. The theory of preference formation by 
Ariely et al., (2003), Loomes et al., (2003) and Tufano, (2010), holds that preferences may be 
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internally consistent but potentially context dependent as strongly influenced by an arbitrary 
anchor, which can be an initial or a preceding bid level in the sequence. This hypothesis is termed 
“Coherent Arbitrariness” by Ariely et al., (2006) and Maniadis et al., (2014) and as the “Shaping 
Hypothesis” by Tufano, (2010) and Loomes et al., (2003).3  
In this paper we return to the issue of consistency and bid dependency in DBDC surveys. Our 
starting point is that repetitive learning (Bateman et al., 2008) can potentially reduce bid 
dependency and observed internal inconsistency between SB and DB estimates. However, we are 
primarily interested in whether advanced information about the sequence of goods to be valued, 
the DB referendum mechanism and institution, and the DB decision rule can have a similar effect 
on behaviour as repetitive learning. In particular with repetitive valuation and disclosure of 
information in advance we test whether preferences are consistent with one of four theories of 
preference formation: 
1. the initial valuations without advanced disclosure or repetitive processes conforms to 
conventional economic theory by demonstrating pre-existent well-formed preferences,  
2. well formed preferences are “discovered” through a process of “learning” which takes 
place during the repetitive valuation and /or advanced disclosure processes (Plott, 1996; 
List 2003), 
3. preferences are internally consistent but arbitrary as “shaped” by preceding bid level 
(Tufano, 2010; Ariely et al., 2003), 
4. or preferences are internally inconsistent and reveal order effects throughout the 
sequence of valuations even when advanced information is provided (Day et al., 2012).  
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The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we describe the design of 
the study. Section 3 describes the methodology and hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 presents the 
results and finally Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Designs for Advanced Information and Repetitive Learning in DBDC 
2.1 Study Design 
In this paper we attempt to create the information effects of a multiple repeat learning design 
(Bateman et al., 2008) by advanced information. We attempt to provide the information 
respondents acquire from repetition by informing them in advance about the DBDC institution, 
and the sequence of goods to be valued. In addition, we also provide information about the 
incentive compatible (IC) double referendum decision rules regarding the provision of the good. 
We test whether this approach is equally or more effective than repetitive learning in reducing 
internal inconsistency and first bid dependency in DBDC responses. In particular, we test 
whether it is capable of producing consistent and non-arbitrary values in both first good as well 
as repeat valuations thus abolishing the need for an initial training round. To this end, we use a 
split sample approach in which the sample is divided into three information treatments: (i) 
Treatment 1, respondents are uninformed about the sequence of goods to be valued, the DBDC 
institution and the incentive compatible decision rules for the double referendum; (ii) Treatment 
2, respondents are informed in advance about the goods to be valued and the DBDC institution in 
terms of the sequence of two bids; and (iii) Treatment 3, respondents are informed in advance 
about the goods to be valued, the DBDC institution and the incentive compatible decision rules 
8 
	  
for the double referendum following the method used to investigate DBDC decision rules in an 
experiment by Carson et al., (2009). Given that in our three treatments two sequential valuations 
are presented to each group we generate a 3×2 design containing six different methods of 
conducting double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation. Four of these methods 
have not previously been studied. We test all six methods for the degree to which they achieve 
internal consistency, freedom from first bid dependency effects, and whether the efficiency of the 
estimates is improved by including the advanced information. Figure 1 summarizes the 
treatments and types of learning considered in this paper. 
 
>>>> Figure 1 
 
For notational purposes we denote 
i
kSBWTP ,  as the single bounded mean willingness to pay for 
valuation i, where i=1 is the first valuation and i=2 is the second valuation and k represents the 
advanced information treatment, where k=1, 2 and 3 according to the level of information 
provided in each treatment (See Figure 1). Similarly, 
i
kDBWTP ,  denotes the double bounded mean 
willingness to pay, and 
i
kWTPΔ =
i
SBkWTP – 
i
DBkWTP . Thus, 
i
kWTPΔ  shows the difference between 
the single bounded and double bounded estimates for each of the six DBDC methods considered 
in Figure 1 as differentiated by information levels and position in the sequence as first or second 
valuation.4 In addition, we estimate an “anchoring” parameter, ikγ , for each case, representing the 
dependency of the responses to the second bid on the level of the first bid; see equations (3) and 
(4) in section 3.5. The value and statistical significance of these two estimates allows us to gage 
the anchoring and consistency present in the six DBDC datasets obtained for the six methods 
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presented below. This also allows us to attribute a preference formation theory to each of these 
learning design methods in Figure 1. 
The first case (Treatment 1 – 1st valuation) in Figure 1 is the standard double-bounded format, 
with uninformed respondents and only one (double bounded) valuation task. The second case 
(Treatment 1 – 2nd valuation) corresponds to the test in Bateman et al., (2008) with uninformed 
respondents but a repeat double bounded valuation of a second good. The four other cases are all 
new methods, the difference being the amount of information provided and with or without 
repeat valuations. What we wish to investigate is whether providing advanced information to 
respondents offers an alternative method for implementing learning design contingent valuation. 
As far as we know, none of our advanced information designs have previously been studied in 
field applications. 
 
2.2 Advanced Information to Respondents on the DBDC Institution and Goods Valued  
In general, DBDC surveys do not inform respondents about the way this mechanism works 
and it is stated that the follow-up question generates a surprise effect that could annoy 
respondents or cause indignation, guilt, strategic behaviours or free-riding. Considering this 
issue, Cooper et al. (2002) introduces descriptive information regarding the follow-up bid in 
order to diminish the surprise effect when individuals face the second question. Advanced 
information on the DBDC institution is a type of learning, which consists of informing 
respondents, before they perform the valuation tasks, about the number of bids that will be 
presented and the way the DBDC mechanism works. The provision of this information also 
facilitates institutional learning effects similar to the repetitive learning design. This is similar to 
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the idea of advanced disclosure and visible choice sets introduced by Bateman et al., (2004). 
Existing literature deals only with the consistency effect of the advanced information. This paper 
is the first to our knowledge to study possible effects of such information on anchoring and bid 
dependency and on preference formation theories.  
In order to test the effect of informing respondent in advance about the DBDC institution and 
the sequence of goods to be valued, we introduce Treatment 2 (Informed DBDC). This treatment 
uses exactly the same questionnaire used in Treatment 1 but it includes additional information. 
We inform respondents that they will vote in two referenda each involving two valuation 
questions. First, they will value renewable energy against a hydropower status quo alternative 
and then they will value renewable energy against a fossil-fuels status quo.5 However, the main 
objective is to explain the DBDC mechanism in a manner which seems reasonable and acceptable 
to respondents. The wording used for this was the following:  
“Because the exact cost of the (renewable energy) projects is not known today, we will ask 
you to vote on two different costs for the project. These costs represent the range into which 
the actual cost should fall. In what follows, you will vote for or against each alternative. You 
are asked how you would vote if the good could be provided at one of the two costs. This is 
followed directly by a second vote on how you would vote if the good could be provided at the 
second of the two costs.” 
It is important to point out that respondents were not informed about the conditionality of the 
second bid. Thus, they did not know that the level of the second bid depends on their response to 
the first bid. This withholding of information is necessary to avoid a clear opportunity for 
strategic behavior in the DBDC mechanism.  
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2.3 Advanced Information to Respondents on the Incentive Compatible Double 
Referendum Decision Rules 
A decision rule in DBDC refers to the conditions that characterize the provision of the good 
under the double referendum mechanism. In the case of DBDC it refers to the explanation of how 
the responses to the two referenda will influence the final decision whether the good will be 
provided or not and at what cost (Carson et al., 2009).  
In this context, two key rules should be explained: i) the percentage of votes required for the 
referendum to pass, and ii) in case the second vote fails, an explanation of whether the good is 
provided at the first price or not provided at all. These are crucial rules affecting the incentive 
compatibility and outcome of the double referendum method. By making decision rules clear to 
respondents, strategic behaviour in the double referendum may be avoided and in consequence, 
the WTP estimates based on the SB and DB information may become more internally consistent 
and exhibit less bid dependent anchoring. 
To study the additional effect of advanced information about the incentive compatible decision 
rules we introduce Treatment 3 (Informed DBDC + IC Double Referendum Decision Rules). In 
addition to the information introduced in Treatment 2, this treatment incorporates an extra 
paragraph presenting an explicit explanation regarding the final outcome of the two votes and 
how this relates to the provision of the good. Decision rules are introduced immediately after the 
first valuation question for each good. Decision rules regarding the final vote cannot be 
introduced before the first valuation question because it would invalidate this response and 
present a clear incentive for strategic behaviour, allowing respondents to answer “no” to the first 
referendum and “yes” to the second one in order to secure the provision of the good at a lower 
cost. In our study it was clearly stated that in the second referendum if a majority of the 
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participants would vote “yes” to the provision of the good, the project would go ahead, otherwise 
the outcome would be the initial status quo level. It was also clearly stated that the second vote 
would replace the decision of the first one, and if this second vote does not pass with a majority 
the good would not be provided at all. On the other hand, if it passes, the good would be provided 
at the cost presented in the second vote. The wording used in this treatment was the following: 
“Now imagine that the cost to you was $________ (the higher or lower second price) and the 
outcome of this second vote replaces that of the first vote, so that if a majority vote “Yes” in 
favour of this proposal the renewable energy projects are developed and if a majority vote 
“No” the Patagonian dams project will go ahead. We will not ask you to vote again at 
another cost on this proposal”.  
“Would you vote Yes or No?” 
An effect on consistency by introducing explicit IC decision rules has been shown in an 
economic laboratory experiment by Carson et al., (2009). With real incentives in place, subjects 
were seen to provide highly biased responses when failure of the second referendum vote was 
described as resulting in the implementation of the outcome of the first referendum. It is quite 
possible that many respondents in field studies implicitly make this (quite realistic) default 
scenario. When this default is not ruled out in the instructions respondents may attempt to exploit 
this possibility by strategically voting Yes/No instead of a demand revealing Yes/Yes vote in an 
attempt to lower the cost of the good. In our case, we study the effect in the field of providing an 
explicit explanation of the outcome of the second vote in a DBDC mechanism for the first time. 
On the other hand, to our knowledge the effect of the IC decision rules on bid dependent 
anchoring has never been studied previously.  
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2.4 Details of the survey and the good 
Electricity demand in Chile is forecasted to increase by 7% per annum over the next 25 years 
(NEC report on electricity prices, 2007). At the moment almost all energy is generated by a mix 
of thermoelectric sources and large hydropower developments, which are recognized to be 
ecologically damaging. We conducted a contingent valuation survey on the willingness to pay 
premium for environmentally friendly renewable energy sources (RES) including biomass, wind, 
and solar power. The survey was conducted by personal interviews in the metropolitan area of 
Santiago and Concepcion, the two largest cities in Chile. The respondent selected for interview 
within each household were those responsible for paying the electricity bill.  
Households were chosen from a random selection of streets from all areas of the city 
following a two stage random sampling procedure, stratified by socio-economic status. The 
different versions of the questionnaires were distributed randomly across households. The 
questionnaire design was based on several focus group discussions and pilot studies conducted in 
both cities. On the basis of the findings of the pilot studies a bid vector was designed following 
the method used in Scarpa and Bateman, (2000) and Hutchinson et al., (2001). The bid vector 
extended from 200 Chilean Pesos (CLP) to 10,000 CLP6 and consisted of six levels of which four 
were used as starting points and the initial bids were randomly allocated for each scenario valued. 
Data was collected from 1093 households. Of these, 90 were rejected due to non-response and 
protests, leaving 1003 responses available for analysis. 
In our contingent valuation questionnaire two valuation tasks were presented sequentially to 
three groups: one group of uninformed respondents, and two groups with two different levels of 
advanced information following Figure 1. The good to be valued was the introduction of a mix of 
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renewable energy sources to produce additional electricity requirements against two alternative 
sources explained below, which were presented sequentially in the same questionnaire. Before 
the valuation questions, individuals were presented with a scenario that included information 
about the Chilean energy market, the rising electricity demand and the need of introduction of 
new energy sources to increase the supply. The good to be valued and each of the status quo 
situations were then described. In the first case, the status quo alternative was the construction of 
large hydro electricity dams in Chilean Patagonia, and in the second case the status quo 
alternative was the installation of thermoelectric power plants in Central Chile7. Individuals were 
asked to treat both scenarios independently following the exclusive list procedure, avoiding 
substitution and related sequencing effects (Carson and Groves, 2007). In order to reduce the 
influence of hypothetical bias a cheap talk script was included (Cummings and Taylor, 1999).  
 
3. Econometric Methods and Hypotheses Tests 
From the referendum data we estimate logit models for both the SB and DB contingent 
valuation responses to identify the effects of providing advanced information on the goods to be 
valued, the DBDC institution and IC decision rules, as well as the effect of repetitive learning on 
the differences between mean WTP from SB and DB estimates, the standard errors of the 
estimates and the estimated anchoring parameters. We investigate four issues: The first two 
concerns the internal consistency between the SB and DB data. The third is to what extent 
advanced information learning and repetitive learning improve the efficiency of SB and DB 
estimates. The fourth and final issue we look at is the effect of advanced information and 
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repetitive learning on the anchoring parameters, representing the dependency of responses to the 
second bid on the value of the first bid. 
 
3.1 The effect of advanced information on internal consistency without repetitive learning 
In order to test the effect of advanced information without repetitive learning we look at the 
difference between SBWTP  and DBWTP  for the first valuation scenario for all three treatments. 
The difference is denoted as 
i
kWTPΔ , where i refers to the scenario valued and k denotes the 
treatment. We test the hypothesis that the difference in estimates of mean WTP between SB and 
DB are zero for each of the three treatments (H0: 0
1
=Δ kWTP ). Based on standard results in the 
literature we expect to reject the hypothesis of consistency in the control treatment (
1
1WTPΔ ) with 
uninformed respondents. For the second treatment (
1
2WTPΔ ) we test whether advanced 
information about the DBDC institution and the goods to be valued is sufficient to result in 
consistent responses. Finally, for the third treatment (
1
3WTPΔ ) we test whether the introduction of 
advanced information about the DBDC institution, the goods to be valued and the IC double 
referendum decision rules result in consistent responses. In order to test for empirical differences 
in mean WTP between SB and DB estimates, we use a bootstrap technique (Efron and Tibshirani, 
1993; Bateman et al., 2008). The reason for selection of this method is the non-independence of 
the values obtained for the two elicitation questions. The responses for the second referendum 
depend on the responses given to the first bid in the SB referendum and they come from the same 
individual, thus generating non-independent responses.8 Therefore, the covariance between these 
two values is not zero and the application of a conventional t-test would be inappropriate.  
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It is also of interest to look at the value differences in 
1
kWTPΔ  between treatments, i.e. the 
treatment effects on the extent of inconsistency in responses between SB and DB. We will test 
the null hypothesis that treatments with additional information will result in a lower difference 
between SB and DB mean WTP, i.e. H0: 0
1
1
1
>Δ−Δ +kk WTPWTP . Thus following Figure 1, we 
will compare the control treatment with Treatment 2 to investigate the effect of adding 
information about the DBDC institution and the goods valued (
1
1WTPΔ -
1
2WTPΔ ), and Treatment 
2 with Treatment 3 to investigate the effect of adding further information about the double 
referendum decision rules (
1
2WTPΔ - 
1
3WTPΔ ).  
 
3.2 The effect of repetitive learning on internal consistency 
As demonstrated by Bateman et al., (2008) experience gained through repetition alone can 
generate internally consistent estimate for SB-DB values in contingent valuation. This repetitive 
valuation is included as initial and repeat valuations in our design. We expect the estimated 
i
kWTPΔ 	   to be lower when respondents face a repeat valuation given that they have had the 
opportunity to learn about their values, the goods and the institution in the earlier valuation. 
Repetitive learning in Treatment 1 with uninformed respondents (
2
1WTPΔ ) is similar to the test in 
Bateman et al., (2008). 
For each treatment we test the null hypotheses that the SB–DB difference is zero; the null 
hypothesis for treatment k and scenario i is H0: 0=Δ
i
kWTP . If for the first treatment we do not 
find support for the null hypothesis for the first valuation scenario but for the second, the finding 
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of Bateman et al., (2008) that LDCV based on repetitive learning is necessary to attenuate the 
SB-DB value difference can be demonstrated. What we investigate here is to what extent 
repetitive learning is important in attenuating the inconsistency in all treatments, even in the 
treatments where respondents have been informed in advance about the sequence of goods to be 
valued, the institution and the double referendum decision rule. 
Finally, we will also look at the differences in 
2
kWTPΔ  between treatments, i.e. the treatment 
effects on the extent of inconsistency in responses between SB and DB for the second good 
valued. Similarly as for the first valuation scenario we compare the control treatment with 
Treatment 2 to investigate the effect of adding advanced information about the DBDC institution 
and the goods to be valued to a single repeat valuation (
2
1WTPΔ 	  versus 
2
2WTPΔ ), and Treatment 
2 with Treatment 3 to investigate the effect of adding information about the IC double 
referendum decision rules to a single repeat valuation (
2
2WTPΔ 	  versus 
2
3WTPΔ ).  
 
3.3 The bootstrap procedure to test internal consistency 
As mentioned above, to test the hypothesis involving a comparison of 
i
SBkWTP  and 
i
DBkWTP 	  
within a treatment, a non-parametric bootstrap technique (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) is used to 
obtain the distribution of differences, 
i
kWTPΔ , and compute the standard errors of these 
differences se(
i
kWTPΔ ) controlling for the sampling design where values are obtained for mean 
WTP from the same sample of respondents. This method was originally outlined in this context 
by Bateman et al., (2008) and involves the generation of repeated sampling with replacement 
from the original sample of households (the primary sampling unit). This technique controls for 
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the non-independence of values, takes into account the covariance between these samples and 
allows for non-normal distributions, which are common in non-market valuations. 
Considering the estimate of difference in mean WTP for the sample, then for a single 
bootstrap sample b drawn with replacements, the estimate from the bth sample will be )(bWTP
i
kΔ
. The estimated standard error ( ) ,i kDBSBWTPse −Δ  using B bootstrap samples, where all samples 
are the same size as the original sample (N), is given by the standard deviation of all B bootstrap 
estimates as follows: 
( )
( )( )
1
 var 1
2
−
Δ−Δ
=Δ
∑
=
B
WTPbWTP
WTP
B
b
i
k
i
k
i
k   (1) 
 
( ) ( )DBikik WTPWTPse ΔΔ var =                           (2) 
 
An empirical distribution of 
i
kWTPΔ  is created using 10,000 replications of SBWTP  – DBWTP . 
We use the percentile method to calculate confidence intervals and analyze the differences in the 
mean WTP. The results of the confidence intervals and the respective	  
i
kWTPΔ  are determined 
using the empirical distributions of differences. The hypothesis is accepted if the 90% confidence 
interval is composed of both negative and positive values and can therefore be shown to contain a 
value of zero difference. The hypothesis is rejected if the 90% confidence interval is composed of 
strictly positive or strictly negative values, meaning that the difference between mean SB-DB 
estimates (
i
kWTPΔ ) is strictly positive or strictly negative. The percentile confidence intervals 
[bp0.05, bp0.95] for a series of B bootstrap samples with estimates b1, b2,…, bB are obtained from the 
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bootstrap distribution of differences using the 5th and 95th percentiles from the ordered set of 
bootstrap values (b1, bB) as bounds for the 90% confidence intervals of the difference.  
 
3.4 Effects of advanced information and repetitive learning on efficiency of WTP estimates 
Introduction of Advanced Information to respondents of the DBDC Institution and goods to be 
valued in Treatment 2 and IC Double Referendum Decision Rules in Treatment 3 may have an 
effect on both the mean and standard errors of SB and DB estimated welfare measures separately. 
This hypothesis establishes whether Treatments 2 and 3 in Figure 1 provide more accurate and 
efficient welfare estimates defined as a reduction in the standard errors as we move from the 
uninformed first valuation control treatment (Treatment 1) to the treatments including advanced 
information (Treatment 2 and 3). To this end, we calculate the coefficient of variation for each 
 WTP estimate in all the treatments and goods valued and compare these results. 
 
3.5 Testing the bid dependent anchoring effect for each good and treatment. 
We want to identify to what extent the value of the first bid offered in DBDC will influence 
the acceptance of the second bid for each good. In particular, we wish to investigate whether the 
influence of anchoring/bid dependency varies between the three treatments with different levels 
of informed choices. 
To test the dependencies of the second bid willingness to pay on the first bid amount we apply 
the anchoring model of Herriges and Shogren, (1996). This model tests for the occurrence and 
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magnitude of the anchoring effect and estimates the extent to which the acceptance level of the 
second bid is affected by the amount of the first bid value offered to the respondent for the same 
good. The method introduces an anchoring parameter, γ, into the logit model which adjusts the 
second bid WTP to become a weighted average of prior WTP and the first bid level offered. The 
anchored Willingness To Pay response to the second bid (WTPr) is: 
10)1( bWTPWTPr γγ +−=     (3) 
where 0WTP  is the prior WTP and 1b  is the initial bid offered to the respondent. The effective 
revised bid level of the second bid, rb2 , then becomes: 
)1(
)( 12
2 γ
γ
−
−
=
bbb r    (4) 
The size and significance of the anchoring parameter is a test to the extent to which the second 
bid response is anchored on the initial bid level. If preferences are coherent, but in an arbitrary 
fashion, bid dependent anchoring is expected to be significant throughout the two valuation tasks. 
On the other hand, for discovered preferences, anchoring should be reduced over the sequence of 
valuation tasks.  
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4 Results 
To begin with, we estimate logit models for single and double bounded responses for the three 
treatments. Parsimonious models are used throughout because of the complexity of the designs 
and testing procedures used. The model estimates are presented in Table A1 in the appendix.  
As expected, the parameter estimates on the bids are negative and significant in all cases and 
are of similar magnitude. Using the estimated parameters we calculate the mean WTP (WTP) for 
the first valuation (WTP for RES over hydropower) and second valuation scenario (WTP for RES 
over thermoelectric) for each treatment. Results are summarized in Table 1. WTP is reported in 
Chilean Pesos. We used the software NLogit for estimation.  
>>>> Table 1 
Results in Table 1 support the findings of Hanemann et al., (1991) and Alberini (1995) about 
the efficiency improvements of DBDC; i.e. that DB estimates are generally more efficient 
welfare measures than SB, as observed by the significantly lower standard errors in all cases. In 
the table we also report the differences between mean WTP in SB and DB (
i
kWTPΔ ) for the six 
DBDC methods considered in Figure 1. We can observe that differences decrease as we move 
from the first valuation in the uninformed treatment to the second valuation in the same treatment 
and even more when advanced information on the DBDC institution, the goods and decision 
rules are provided to respondents (Treatments 2 and 3). In order to test the null hypothesis that 
i
kWTPΔ 	  is zero we employ the bootstrap procedure as described above. Employing the percentile 
method we construct a 90% empirical confidence interval. Results are reported in Table 2. We 
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use the 90% confidence interval because although the overall sample is over 1000, the nature of a 
three treatment design means we have just over 300 respondents in the treatments.  
>>>> Table 2 
Before we proceed with the results in detail it is necessary to comment on the results for 
Treatment 1 - the Uninformed Treatment. The difference in mean WTP between the SB and DB 
format is very large for the first good valued in that treatment. Still we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of consistency in willingness to pay as is shown in Table 2. This is a consequence of 
the high standard error in mean WTP for the SB response (see Table 1). We believe that this is 
another manifestation of the problem with the first valuation in a SB question format. This result 
is also in line with the uncommented findings on the initial SB standard error in Bateman et al., 
(2008). We will therefore proceed with testing the hypotheses for advanced information and 
repetitive learning, since we believe this result for 
1
1WTPΔ  is driven by the large standard error in 
the one-shot single bounded question. 
 
4.1 The results of advanced information learning on internal consistency without repetitive 
learning  
The effects of advanced information learning without repetitive learning are revealed by the 
hypotheses tests for equality in SB and DB WTP in Table 2. The null hypothesis of consistency 
between 
i
SBkWTP  and 
i
DBkWTP  cannot be rejected for the initial valuation in the two treatments 
with advanced information (Treatments 2 and 3). This is an indication that advanced information 
about the DBDC institution and goods valued affects the understanding of the institution and 
23 
	  
produces a high degree of internal consistency even in first valuations. This highlights two new 
methods for conducting Learning Design Contingent Valuation using Advanced Information and 
adds considerably to the insights in Bateman et al., (2008). At the same time, given the high 
variance presented in the SB estimate, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of consistency for the 
uninformed control treatment even though the difference in WTP estimates (
i
WTP1Δ ) is 
substantial. In addition, in the uninformed control treatment the SB-DB difference is significantly 
different from zero in the second valuation. Our findings in this Table 1 clearly suggest that in 
many ways advanced information has stronger effects than repetitive learning in producing 
internally consistent estimates.  
Table 2 shows increasing consistency in first valuations as more advanced information is 
given to respondents. In Table 3 we test whether each of the two additional information 
treatments make a statistically significant improvement in SBDB consistency. This is what we 
call the Treatment Effect.  
>>>> Table 3 
Table 3 shows that both additional information treatments make a significant improvement in 
reducing the SBDB value differences. Introducing advanced information learning about the 
DBDC institution and the good valued reduces the differences (between Treatment 1 and 2) by 
almost 63% and the addition of IC double referenda decision rules reduces this by a further 31% 
(between Treatment 2 and 3). Thus, advanced information to respondents offers an alternative 
method to repetition for implementing learning design contingent valuation. 
24 
	  
4.2 The results of repetitive learning on internal consistency 
Based on the findings in Bateman et al., (2008) we expect that performing repeated valuation 
questions would result in responses that are internally consistent once respondents have gained 
valuation experience. If we begin with the control treatment method (1), we can observe in Table 
2 that 
i
kWTPΔ  is substantially lower in the second valuation scenario. However, in this case 
2
1WTPΔ 	  is still significantly different from zero. Thus, contrary to Bateman et al., (2008) a single 
repeat DB valuation of a second good was not sufficient to obtain SB-DB consistency. What 
about the two other treatments? For both treatments with advanced information, the second 
valuation differences’ 
2
kWTPΔ 	  are smaller compared to the first valuation differences’ 
1
kWTPΔ , 
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no differences between SB and DB estimates in the 
second valuation scenario for treatments 2 and 3.9  
Finally, the treatment effect is also sizeable and statistically significant for the second 
valuation scenario (See Table 3). Consequently, there is a combined effect of information and 
repetitive learning in attenuating the inconsistency in these responses. 
 
4.3 The results of advanced information and repetitive learning on statistical efficiency 
Both advanced information and repeated valuation scenarios seem to result in increased 
statistical efficiency. From Table 2 we see that the standard errors decreases in Treatments 2 and 
3, and that they also decrease for the second good valued. However, it is somewhat misleading to 
look at the standard errors alone since the mean estimates change as well. In order to illustrate 
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this more clearly we calculate the coefficient of variation for each estimated WTP; i.e. the ratio of 
the standard deviation to the mean. Results can easily be derived from Table 1. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of variation is only reduced by advanced information in the SB estimates for the first 
valuation scenario where the coefficient of variation decreases from 0.19 in the treatment with 
uninformed respondents to 0.13 and 0.10 in treatments 2 and 3 respectively. This suggests that 
advanced information, perhaps surprisingly, only affects the efficiency of the SB estimates and it 
has no effect on the efficiency of the DB estimates. 
 
4.4 The results on bid dependent anchoring tests and preference formation theories 
In this section we report the findings from our anchoring models to investigate the effects of 
advanced information and repetitive learning on anchoring and the apparent processes of 
preference formation. These tests allows us to determine whether the internal consistency 
between SB and DB estimates is consistent with the standard theory of pre-existing well-formed 
preferences, the discovered preference theory of Plott, (1996) and Plott and Zeiler, (2005) or with 
coherent arbitrariness by anchoring their WTP on the first bid level in the double referendum. 
The estimated anchoring models are shown in the Appendix Table A2. Table 4 shows the values 
of the anchoring coefficients for each of our 6 treatments. 
>>>>  Table 4 
The estimated anchoring coefficients reveal a number of interesting results. First, the increased 
levels of advance information provided to the respondent significantly reduce the value of the 
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anchoring parameter from 0.83 to 0.37 for the first good valued (Hydroelectric power). However, 
in all three cases, the anchoring coefficient is statistically significant, indicating that respondents 
are anchoring on the first bid level to some extent in all three first good treatments. Second, for 
the second good valued (Thermo-electric power baseline), the anchoring parameters are reduced 
in the two informed treatments and are not significantly different from zero. Thus, with repetitive 
learning and advanced information we find no support for an influence of anchoring. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions on Learning and Preference Formation Theories  
This paper studies the effect of advanced information learning and repetitive learning on the 
reduction of inconsistencies between single and double bounded welfare estimates and bid 
dependent anchoring effects in DBDC contingent valuation datasets. We show that the inclusion 
of these processes of learning, especially when combined, significantly reduces both anomalies, 
producing internally consistent and non-bid dependent WTP estimates. Furthermore, the 
advanced information estimates also present significantly lower standard errors showing better 
statistical efficiency than for the first good uninformed DBDC valuations as currently used in 
most published DBDC studies. In Table 5 we summarize the results for each of the six different 
DBDC methods used in this paper. Of particular interest are the four new methods that introduce 
advanced information on the institutions, the goods to be valued and IC double referendum 
decision rules. These LDCV designs perform much better in tests for DBDC convergence, 
statistical efficiency and anchoring than the traditional method in Hanneman et al., (1991) or the 
repetition only method of LDCV in Bateman et al., (2008). 
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>>>>  Table 5  
The greatest degree of SB-DB consistency, statistical efficiency and non-significant anchoring 
effects occur by combining the advanced information treatments with repetitive learning, by 
valuing a second good. As in Bateman et al., (2008) internal consistency is easier to achieve than 
freedom from bid dependent anchoring in DBDC data sets. Advanced information learning in 
both treatments is capable of producing SB-DB consistency in WTP estimates without repetition. 
The unexpected apparent consistency in the uninformed treatment is related to the very large 
variance on the SB estimate, which was also observed by Bateman et al., (2008). Such SB 
variance cannot only be addressed by repetitive mechanisms following Hanneman et al., (1991) 
but by the advanced information treatments introduced in this study.  
Bid dependent anchoring is however more difficult to address through learning. While 
advanced information results in substantial reductions in the anchoring parameters, these 
parameters only become insignificant when advanced information is combined with repetitive 
learning in valuing a second good. In the case of our uninformed second valuation, neither 
consistency nor non-arbitrariness is demonstrated although statistical efficiency is improved and 
anchoring effects lessened from the uninformed first valuation.  
The evidence in Table 5 with respect to the major theories of preference formation is clear. If 
a-priori well-formed preferences existed in any of our datasets they would be exhibited by 
consistency and lack of bid dependent anchoring in the first valuation treatments. While there is 
evidence of consistency in the informed first valuation treatments, anchoring is always present so 
this theory of a-priori well formed preference can be largely discounted for initial valuation 
DBDC. Many other field studies have similarly found an absence of initial well-formed 
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preferences with evidence abounding of anchoring and large value differences in SB and DB 
WTP estimates; see Carson and Groves, (2007, 2010). Similarly the newer repetitive formats of 
Discrete Choice Experiments are starting to produce abundant evidence that the first choice in the 
sequence “is the hardest” (Carlsson et al., 2012; Hess et al., 2012) and that initial choices show 
preference inconsistency when compared to subsequent choices and larger variance that all 
subsequent choices (Czajkowski et al., 2014; Day et al., 2014).  
Our findings show clear evidence of Coherent Arbitrariness with considerable consistency in 
SB-DB WTP values in our two informed first valuation treatments where in spite of reductions in 
the anchoring parameter estimate, bid dependency remain statistically significant in these 
informed initial valuation treatments. Contrary to other studies, our second uninformed valuation 
shows a significant difference between SB and DB WTP. Also exhibiting a significant bid 
dependent anchoring parameter this particular method shows both types of bias and must be 
classified as showing both inconsistent and arbitrary preferences. By contrast the two informed 
repetitive valuations convincingly show consistent WTP and non-anchored preferences and are 
therefore strongly consistent with Plott’s Discovered Preference Hypothesis showing well-
formed preferences when both informed and repetitive learning processes are combined within 
the LDCV design. Previous studies on repetitive learning have also tended to endorse the 
Discovered Preference Hypothesis. This paper strongly replicates these findings of Bateman et 
al., (2008) in an enhanced design, field application, while also providing for the first time 
convincing evidence for Coherent Arbitrary Preferences when different levels of advanced 
information are provided in non-repetitive one-off DBDC studies.  
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The policies implications of our findings are clear. The DBDC format can produce 
inconsistent and/or bid dependent estimates all equating to irrational preferences. When the 
DBDC is used for policy purposes; e.g. this study on renewable energy in Chile, the Herriges and 
Shogren, (1996) bid dependency test and the SBDB consistency test outlined in Equation 2 
should be presented. This would assure policy makers that preferences and values are free from 
internal inconsistency and the Tufano, (2010) and Ariely et al., (2003) arbitrariness. 
Understanding of these effects in DCEs lags behind DBDC. Here the unresolved preference 
inconsistency of learning and fatigue remains a subject of recent major papers such as Hess et al., 
(2012) and Carlsson et al., (2012), while the arbitrariness of preferences is an interesting area 
open for further research.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. SB and DB Logit models for Treatments 1 to 3 and valuations 1 and 2. 
t-values in parentheses. 
1st Valuation (Hydropower baseline) 
 
Treatment 1: 
 Uninformed 
Treatment 2:  
Informed DBDC 
Treatment 3:  
Informed DBDC +ICDR 
  SB  DB  SB  DB  SB  DB 
Constant 
 2.37 
(7.39) 
 2.35 
(11.94) 
 2.52 
(8.00) 
 2.36 
(11.15) 
 2.47 
(8.30) 
 2.34 
(11.54) 
Bid 
 -0.50 
(-3.33) 
 -0.61 
(-12.12) 
 -0.67 
(-4.49) 
 -0.71 
(-12.44) 
 -0.72 
(-5.16) 
 -0.70 
(-13.08) 
Log 
Likelihood  -157.23       -376.77       -151.52  -369.34  -167.63  -375.68      
Number of 
Observations 
 340  340  323  323  340  340 
             
2nd Valuation (Thermoelectric Baseline) 
 
Treatment 1: 
 Uninformed 
Treatment 2:  
Informed DBDC 
Treatment 3:  
Informed DBDC+ICDR 
  SB  DB  SB  DB  SB  DB 
Constant 
 2.16 
(8.48) 
 2.31 
(14.00) 
 1.92 
(7.69) 
 1.79 
(11.61) 
 1.88 
(7.71) 
 1.96 
(12.88) 
Bid 
 -0.42 
(-6.33) 
 -0.49 
(-14.23) 
 -0.50 
(-7.46) 
 -0.49 
(-13.12) 
 -0.43 
(-6.83) 
 -0.45 
(-13.67) 
Log 
Likelihood  -186.93    -410.52  -187.45  -423.03  -200.68       -439.29 
Number of 
Observations 
 340  340  323  323  340  340 
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Table A2. Logit models with anchoring for Treatments 1 to 3 and valuations 1 and 2. 
t-values in parentheses. 
       1st Valuation (Hydropower baseline) 
 
Treatment 1: Treatment 2:  Treatment 3:  
 Uninformed Informed DBDC Informed DBDC +ICDR 
Constant  
1.601 
 
1.729 
 
1.997 
(6.41) (6.92) (7.98) 
Bid 
 
-0.125 
 
-0.277 
 
-0.48 
(-1.10) (-2.48) (-4.31) 
Gamma 
 
0.832 
 
0.669 
 
0.366 
( 5.39) (4.90) (2.289) 
Log Likelihood   -367 
 
-362 
 
-374 
Observations 
  340  323  340 
2nd Valuation (Thermoelectric Baseline) 
  
Treatment 1: Treatment 2:  Treatment 3:  
 Uninformed Informed DBDC Informed DBDC +ICDR 
Constant 
 1.79  1.703 
 
1.728 
(7.96) 
 
(7.04) (7.28) 
Bid 
 -0.315  -0.465 
 
-0.377 
(-5.66) 
 
(-8.39) (-7.10) 
Gamma 
 0.436  0.068 
 
0.194 
(4.17) 
 
(0.59) (1.64) 
Log Likelihood   -403   -423   -438 
Observations 
  
340  323  340 
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Figure 1. A Repetitive Learning Design with Three Information Treatments and Test 
Statistics for SB DB Consistency and Anchoring Effects  
Treatment 
1st Valuation 
Renewable energy instead of 
Hydro power 
2nd Valuation 
Renewable energy instead 
of Thermoelectric power 
1. Uninformed  11WTPΔ 	  	  	  	  
1
1γ 	  
2
1WTPΔ 	  	  	  	  	  	   21γ  
2. Informed of DBDC process 12WTPΔ 	  	  	  	  	   12γ  
2
2WTPΔ 	  	  	  	  	  	   22γ  
3. Informed of DBDC process and 
Double Referendum Decision Rules 
1
3WTPΔ 	  	  	  	  	   13γ  
2
3WTPΔ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   23γ  
i
kWTPΔ  = Difference between SB and DB for the advanced information treatment k and the valuation i.  
i
kγ  = Anchoring parameter for the advanced information treatment k and the valuation i. 
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Table 1. SB and DB mean WTP first and second valuations for Treatments k=1 to 3. 
Standard errors calculated using the Delta Method in parentheses.  
 
 
1st Valuation 
Hydroelectric power 
2nd Valuation 
Thermoelectric power 
Treatment 1 , kSBWTP  
1
,kDBWTP  
1
kWTPΔ 	  
2
, kSBWTP 	  
2
,kDBWTP  
2
kWTPΔ  
1) Uninformed 
4,777 
(902) 
3,878 
(191) 
898 
 
5,122 
(414) 
4,674 
(230) 
447 
 
    Coeff. Variation 0.19 0.05 
 
0.08 0.05  
2) Informed DBDC 
3,787 
(474) 
3,344 
(161) 
444 
 
3,850 
(265) 
3,632 
(218) 
218 
 
Coeff. Variation 0.13 0.05 
 0.07 0.06  
3) Informed DBDC + 
ICDR 
3,425 
(351) 
3,350 
(161) 
75 
 
4,383 
(318) 
4,359 
(244) 
24 
 
Coeff. Variation 0.10 0.05 
 
0.07 0.06  
Note: 1 USD=470 Chilean Pesos (CLP) at the time of the survey. 
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Table 2. Consistency tests of difference in mean WTP, Ho: 0=Δ
i
kWTP 	   for both goods 
(valuations i=1 and i=2).  
Treatment  
90% Confidence 
Interval 
Test Result 
Ho: 0=Δ
i
kWTP  
     
Treatment 1: Uninformed                    
i
WTP1Δ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b0.05                            b 0.95 
First valuation       1445 -36 3886 Accept 
Second valuation    514 28 1149 Reject 
 
Treatment 2: Informed DBDC              
i
WTP 2Δ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b0.05                            b 0.95 
First valuation        500 -92 1417 Accept 
Second valuation    234 -19 499 Accept 
 
Treatment 3: Inform DBDC +ICDR  
i
WTP 3Δ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  b0.05                                   b 0.95 
First valuation       148 -321 783 Accept 
Second valuation   42 -258 377 Accept 
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Table 3. Tests of Treatment differences 01 >Δ−Δ +ikik WTPWTP  
 i
k
i
k WTPWTP 1+Δ−Δ  
 
t-test,  
P-value H0: 
01 >Δ−Δ +
i
k
i
k WTPWTP  
Test result 
Treatment 1 vs 2    
First valuation 
1
2
1
1 WTPWTP Δ−Δ  
 
945 
 
0.000 
 
Accept 
Second valuation  
2
2
2
1 WTPWTP Δ−Δ  
 
280 
 
0.000 
 
Accept 
Treatment 2 vs 3    
First valuation	  
1
3
1
2 WTPWTP Δ−Δ  
 
353 
 
0.000 
 
Accept 
Second valuation 
2
3
2
2 WTPWTP Δ−Δ  
 
192 
 
0.000 
 
Accept 
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Table 4. Estimated anchoring coefficients, ikγ , for each treatment and valuation    
scenario.  
 
Treatment 
1st Valuation 
Hydroelectric power 
 2nd Valuation 
Thermoelectric power 
 ikγ  
Standard 
Errors 
 i
kγ  
Standard 
Errors 
1. Uninformed 0.83 (0.15)  0.44 (0.10) 
2. Informed DBDC 0.67 (0.14)  0.07 (0.12) 
3: Informed DBDC +ICDR 0.37 (0.16)  0.19 (0.12) 
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Table 5. Summary of results for first and repeat valuations for the 3 DBDC treatments    
DBDC Methods 
Consistency in 
DBDC data 
0=WTPΔ  
No Anchoring in 
DBDC data, 0=ikγ   
Preference 
formation theory 
implied 
First valuation 
Uninformed 
Yes No Coherent Arbitrariness 
First valuation 
Informed of DBDC 
Yes No Coherent Arbitrariness 
First valuation 
Informed of DBDC 
and ICDR 
Yes No Coherent Arbitrariness 
Second Valuation 
Uninformed 
No No Non Coherent and Arbitrary 
Second Valuation 
Informed of DBDC 
Yes Yes Discovered Preferences 
Second Valuation 
Informed of DBDC 
and ICDR 
Yes Yes Discovered Preferences 
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Footnotes 
 
[1] For a detailed review of the method see Hanemann (1984); Bateman et al., (2002). 
 
[2] The earlier literature on the SB-DB inconsistency in first good valuations was based on 
behavioural explanations of this inconsistency and how inconsistency in voting patterns between 
SB and DB referenda could arise. Such theories are well reviewed in Carson and Groves, (2007); 
they include “surprise” at the appearance of the second vote, “averaging” the first and second bid 
values, and gain-loss asymmetries. An experiment testing several of these theories is reported in 
Burton et al., (2003); while Burton et al., (2009) studies the voting patterns arising in the initial 
double referendum from competing theories. It would appear that different individual voters are 
motivated by different strategies and patterns of response to the initial double referendum 
including demand revealing responses. This makes modelling such response problematic. 
 
[3] Maniadis et al., (2014) question the robustness of the type of initial value anchoring effect 
found in studies such as Ariely et al., (2003) and they call for independent replications to confirm 
such findings. The Shaping Hypothesis of Tufano, (2010) and Loomes et al., (2003) is based on 
the dependency of an immediately preceding valuation. This has similarities to the Herriges and 
Shogren, (1996) bid dependency model, showing the effect of an initial SB bid level on the 
response to the follow up DB bid. This type of “anchoring” within SBDB valuation appears to be 
a very robust effect frequently replicated in many Stated Preferences data sets of this type. This is 
the type of shaping or bid dependency explored in our paper. 
 
[4] Please note 
i
kWTPΔ  is used throughout this paper as the difference in the WTP for the same 
good elicited from the same dataset using the SBDC and the DBDC elicitation methods. This is 
an important and well documented test of internal inconsistency in the DBDC method; see 
Carson and Groves, (2007, 2010). 
 
[5] The wording used in this part of the questionnaire was: “In producing the 15% extra 
electricity required in Chile we are looking at how much more you would be willing to pay for 
this renewables alternative over the two other types of energy. In what follows you will be asked 
how you would vote if a referendum was held to choose between renewable energy and each of 
the other alternatives in this order: First, renewable energy versus hydropower and second 
renewable energy versus thermoelectric power ”. 
 
[6] 1 USD=470 Chilean Pesos (CLP) at the time of the survey. 
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[7] These two status quo alternatives are the two real options that Chile has available for 
increasing energy generation in order to meet the rising energy demand of the country. 
 
[8] Variance of the differences, var∆WTP = var(WTPSB – WTPDB ) = var(WTPSB) + 
var(WTPDB) – 2*cov(WTPSB – WTPDB). In non-independent samples, the covariance is not 
zero, therefore the use of a statistical test designed for independent samples is not appropriate. 
 
[9] Although we should be careful with directly comparing the estimates between the valuation 
scenarios since they involve different goods, we see that the difference between SB and DB mean 
WTP is consistently lower in the second valuation scenario for all treatments. Thus, there is an 
effect of repetitive learning on consistency even for the treatments where respondents already 
obtain the information about the institution, the goods valued and IC double referendum decision 
rules in advance. 
 
 
